The Possible, the Probable and the Certainty of Biocrimes
The risks of dual use biotechnologies
The advances in biotechnology have made it possible to map the human genome, then to map the genome of many other organisms, and finally to create vast databases to store this bioinformation to select and build what these human tools can imagine. But this mapping knowledge did not explain the function of the genes, which gave rise to the field of proteomics, or understanding the proteins produced by the genes. This science explores the proteins that carry the signals to shape forms of life in its many variations, not only between species and subspecies but from individual to individual.
With biotechnology, farmers could grow yields beyond anything in history, and today genetically modified organisms are grown in almost every part of the world. Almost half of four major crops are genetically modified ones.[1] But the dual use concerns in biotechnology suggest that for every useful, life-saving biotechnology, there is a use for it that may be destructive. In the case of genetically modified crops, it is the uniformity of the genome, itself, that makes it vulnerable to human or natural devastation from a single plague exploiting its single weakness. A single plant plague that exploits a vulnerability of a genetically modified crop, anywhere in the world, could destroy a good part of the world’s crop. A singular plague could present the same threat to farms with uniform, genetically modified salmon.
The development of component engineering for genetics further advanced the ability to use biotechnology. Synthetic biology is component engineering, often referred to as the Lego blocks of building life, making it simpler and much faster for building genetic alterations of bacteria, for example. One of the first “parlor tricks” of this technology was to make bacteria smell like bananas. However, this new technology has exceeded the review authority of regulatory frameworks in some cases. For example, Craig Venter, credited with being first with NIH in mapping the human genome, sponsored a May 2014 report that warned: “Genetically engineered organisms are increasingly being developed in ways that leave them outside of APHIS’ authority to review, and synthetic biology will accelerate this trend.”[2]
The age of biocrime could very likely take advantage of these vulnerabilities.
Genomic Crimes
The popularization of do-it-yourself (DIY) biology has made it possible for high school students and undergraduates with no microbiology background to engineer DNA with components in the new field of synthetic biology. No longer do you need to string together pieces of DNA and hope for the best. Now, components designed like Lego blocks that fit neatly together can be used to greatly accelerate the genetic design process. For example, inserting a gene that causes a perceptible feature can be done by almost anyone, now, with a weekend of training, made possible with synthetic biology. More recently, the development of the CRISPR tool, makes the original genetic engineering task that took weeks and months take mere hours with greater precision in inserting or deleting a single gene, unlike the much cruder tools of the past.
The rapid development of these tools, the ten-fold decrease in cost, and the ubiquity with which it is being used by anyone with an interest has increased the design possibilities. The iGEM competition is a gathering place for teams inspired to design a useful or creative project with synthetic biology sharing the information and advancing the art. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been a sponsor of this competition, knowing its potential. A culture of safety and being aware of the power of these tools is a reminder that it requires great responsibility. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has rightly recognized that being a part of the process by being at iGEM is “walking the beat” of the new biotechnological streets of society.
Biocrime may have a more difficult time taking root in these communities but it does not prevent the “lone wolf” ambitions of biocrime.
Genomic Misdeamenors
The identification of genomic fraud is now possible with genetic testing, for example, to discover if you are eating what you were told you were being served in a restaurant or sold in a grocery store. In one reported instance, high school students tested the sushi in a restaurant and found the restaurant was using tilapia as a substitute for white tuna.[3] This is clearly fraud, but who is going to investigate? Should the state fraud statutes be used against restaurants and grocery stores which can no longer simply defraud their customers with impunity? If so, law enforcement will have to become educated on genomics and perhaps develop a specialized genomic fraud squad with special training in order to identify these genomic misdemeanors.
Crop destruction by design
With the virtue of being able to feed the world with genetically modified crops, also comes the dark side of the technology. Due to the worldwide use of genetically modified crops, the genomes are almost identical making this mono-culture crop vulnerable to being completely destroyed by a fungus or other disease that happens to find the weakness in the genome. Such an attack, either by Mother Nature or a designed disease, would potentially destroy a large part of the world’s food crop for one or more seasons. For example, through natural selection over the years, bananas have become a mono-culture around the world in banana plantations. Currently, this fruit is at risk of extinction due to a fungus that is attacking this monoculture of commercial banana plantations. The potential for attacks on mono-culture crops could be a criminal opportunity.
In order to ensure against the possibility of entire mono-culture extinctions, the use of the seed banks that have been built to ensure old seed stocks survive might become vital to re-establishing crops. Private collections of seed banks could also become important, despite the possibility of keeping the genome in a digital form.
Personalized DNA weapons
The rise of personalized medicine that is responsive to particular genetic markers and types is one of the most important advances in cancer treatments. However, this precision can also create vulnerabilities just as easily as it can create opportunities. Engineering a virus to target individuals with a particularly genetic marker, might at first be used to target high level officials in assassinations, but would soon become available for wider use for targeted killings of domestic crimes. This would undoubtedly be of interest to the military, as well, and targeted killings of the enemy would be a logical extension of this process.
The use of precision “biotechnological weapons” has been discussed as some of the most frightening of all weapons. The use of “direct integration” involves injecting DNA directing into another human through the use of specialized bullets and guns. Once inside the body, the DNA would be designed to infect the human to disable, kill, or alter the person. Other uses might include pheromones affecting certain genotypes that would alter behavior in ways that would not be conducive to defending against an enemy. Surprising, these ideas have been part of the discourse for more than a decade, but are now frighteningly close to possible.[4] The Biological Weapons Convention arguably would extent to these kinds of weapons, and the scope of the definition in the Convention has been increased to include these in subsequent meetings of the parties.[5]
Identity theft for financial access
Mobile banking, bitcoin transactions with the new blockchain feature that can trace the origin of bitcoin transactions are all digital systems that may in the near future be accessible based on bio-identifiers. For example, the use of retina scanners and fingerprint access is already commonly used even for unlocking individual smartphones and laptops. The possibility of using the unique genetic signature of a person would ensure the uniqueness of that identifier and may one day be used for financial transaction confirmations.
The Genetic Information Nondiscriminatory Act of 2008 (“GINA”)[6] was created to protect the privacy of individuals, finally making a federal statute which in part, replaced similar state statutes passed over the previous ten years in all fifty states. This statute prohibited the use of genetic information by employers against an employee or against an insured by an insurance company, against discrimination in the case of employers and for pre-existing conditions in the case of insurance companies. This may be remembered in the future as the first statute on which later amendments were added to protect us from genetic identity theft, and genetic crimes by protecting individual’s genome identifiers. This statute might also be amended in the future to prevent the possession of another persons’ genome with intent to use it to harm them or to steal from them. This statute could very well be the foundation statute of the age of biocrime and the first statute to protection one’s genomic identifier.
In the future, the use of fingerprints, retinal scans or DNA tags could be used to ensure privacy and security of financial accounts. The need to keep one’s DNA safe from being stolen will be a new requirement to guard against financial theft and other privacy invasions. The fact that “open source” DNA can be collected from discarded paper cups, cigarette butts, napkins and a host of other sources, makes the task of keeping your DNA secure, daunting. The surreptitious collection of DNA could be a new criminal industry, sold like stolen credit cards and ID cards.
[1] 49% of cotton, soybeans, canola and maize grown worldwide are genetically modified. See http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/pocketk/16/ (last visited 4-8-2017).
[2] Sarah R. Carter, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND THE U.S. BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATORY SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS (J. Craig Venter Inst. 2014), available at http://www.jcvi.org/cms/research/projects/synthetic-biology-and-the-us- biotechnology-regulatory-system/overview/.
[3] See e.g., John Schwartz, Fish Tale Has DNA Hook: Students Find Bad Labels,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/22/science/22fish.html (reporting about high-school students exposing the sushi restaurant for passing tilapia as white tuna).
[4] Guo Ji-weo & Xue-sen Yang, Ultramicro, Nonlethal, and Reversible: Looking Ahead to Military Biotechnology, 85 MIL. REV. 75 (2005) (citing David M. Mahvi, Michael J. Sheehy & Ning-Sun Yang, DNA Cancer Vaccines: A Gene Gun Approach, 75 IMMUNOLOGY & CELL BIOLOGY 456, 459 (1997)).
[5] See Victoria Sutton, Emerging Biotechnologies and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention: Can it Keep Up with the Biotechnology Revolution? Special Edition: New Technology, Old Law: Rethinking National Security,” 2 Tex. A&M L.R. 695-718 (2015).
[6] Pub.L. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881.